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SELLING OUR WAY INTO POVERTY: The Commercialisation of Poverty in 
Malawi 
 
Abstract 
The aim of the article is to investigate the impact of commercialisation on household 
poverty in Malawi using the 1997/98 Integrated Household Survey data. The results 
indicate that overall those household who were more commercialised were better off than 
those who did not and thus commercialisation should be encouraged as a means of 
alleviating poverty. In terms of regional analysis the southern region and the central 
region results indicate that the more commercialised households were actually worse off. 
Furthermore, the livelihoods of the most vulnerable households (female headed and poor 
households) did not benefit from commercialisation. Therefore, in terms of policies, it is 
important that government should identify groups that are likely losers to 
commercialisation and hence the need for compensatory or socially protective policy 
design to socio-economic groups whose incomes have been reduced by 
commercialisation.   
 
Keywords: 
Commercialisation, Poverty, Propensity Score Matching, Household Model, Malawi. 
 
JEL classification: C31, I31, Q12  
 2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Malawi is one of the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa to adopt the structural 
adjustment programmes following an economic crisis in the late 1970s that manifested in 
negative growth rates in gross domestic product in 1980 and 1981. Most macroeconomic 
policies under the structural adjustment programme focused on liberalisation of 
international and domestic trade including liberalisation of agricultural prices and 
marketing, removal of agricultural subsidies, reduction in trade tariffs and removal of non 
tariff barriers to trade, liberalisation of the exchange rate system, liberalisation of the 
financial sector and interest rates and provision of investment incentives.  Among other 
things, these reforms were expected to raise the incomes of smallholder farmers and 
hence increase their entitlement to food through the market. Even though these reforms 
have been in line with the general trend in the development discourse which is in favour 
of commercialisation, how well it works in different contexts depends on the 
characteristics of the households, potential of the local market as well as the legal and 
political framework in which the commercialisation is to take place. 
 
Furthermore, the success of further commercialisation in relieving poverty depends on 
how well the households are currently integrated in the market and to what extent the 
opportunities provided by specialisation have already been exploited. This article aims at 
providing evidence of the magnitude and nature of the welfare impact of 
commercialisation in Malawi.  
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The central hypothesis is that increased participation in trade at the local market is likely 
to increase consumer/producer surplus for the participating household and thus increase 
the household’s welfare. Hence, agricultural market participation is likely to increase the 
consumption level of the household thorough increased levels of trade.  
 
The question that comes to the fore after considering the above issues is as follows; what 
has been the impact of commercialisation on poverty? Another related questions is, are 
there any biases in the distribution of benefits to different groups, and if so, what are the 
sources of these? The purpose of this paper therefore is to answer the above questions.  
 
The article is structured along six main sections. In Section 2, we review the links 
between commercialisation and poverty. We lay the theoretical framework and empirical 
strategy in section 3. The econometrics is discussed in section 4 while section 5 presents 
results of the analysis. Lastly, conclusions and policy implications are presented in the 
section 6 of the article.  
 
2. COMMERCIALISATION AND POVERTY  
 
This section sketches a framework for thinking through the effects of commercialisation 
on household poverty (Figure 1). Poverty as a characteristic of households or individuals 
is defined in terms of a predetermined minimum level of real income (or consumption), 
and is measured in terms of the numbers of people who live below this minimum 
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(headcount poverty).  Commercialisation is likely to cause beneficial outcomes through 
several links. 
 
    [Figure 1 around here] 
 
First is the subsistence food channel. The reduction of transaction cost creates a stronger 
price incentive for a producer to engage in trade. The access to markets and effective 
transportation networks would lead to an increased number of suppliers. This increase in 
suppliers leads to more reliable supply of food crops and less volatile prices at the 
markets. One effect of this is the lowering of the risk involved in trade which would then 
allow otherwise risk-avert and vulnerable households to specialise and benefit from 
selling cash crops as well as consuming larger variety of goods acquired from the market.  
 
The second link between commercialisation and poverty is through the employment 
market. Commercialisation of agriculture leads to a substantial expansion of demand for 
hired labour, which contributes to the income earning possibilities of poor households. 
This employment link allows households to increase their purchase of food items and non 
food items which leads to improved household welfare. 
 
The final link is through the market surplus. Commercialisation does not only relate to 
selling cash crops but commercialisation of food crops is also an important part of 
enhanced livelihoods in poor households. Usually production for the market is only done 
when the household’s basic demand for food has been ensured. It is the surplus that is 
 5 
marketed. Either way, whether it is cash crops or surplus food crops, when they are 
marketed they provide the household with income which enhances household welfare.  
 
It is however important to note that the way in which these possible increased welfare of 
the household finally translates into increased welfare of the individuals depends on the 
decision making process within the household. 
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
In this article the term commercialisation is used based on the definition by Braun & 
Kennedy (1994) who defined commercialisation as the market integration of household 
economy so that larger part of consumption is acquired through market transactions, as 
such our commercialisation variable is defined as a proportion of the consumption that is 
bought from the market, i.e. as a proportion bound between 0 and 1. This takes the value 
1, if a household derive over 50 per cent of its income from cash agriculture and 0 for a 
household who derive over 50 per cent of its income from own consumption.  In our 
analysis commercialisation is equated to participation in market agriculture on the basis 
of 50 per cent cut off point.  
 
The analysis of whether participation in any programme enhances the livelihood of rural 
people can be formulated in the framework of Roy’s (1951) self-selection model 
developed to explain occupational choice and its consequences for the distribution of 
income. Like Roy’s model where individuals choose between fishing and hunting 
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depending on their endowments in occupation-specific skills, our model assumes that 
households decide either to engage in cash market agriculture (participation) or not (non-
participation) based on utility maximisation. For each household ,,...1, Nhh =  let jhU  be 
the utility associated with each decision hJ  where JJ h ∈  is an indicator variable so that 
(1,0)j =  representing the decision to either participate or not, respectively. We assume 
that total utility is a function of daily per capita household expenditure associated with 
each alternative so that total utility is given by:  
 
hhjjhjh ejzyU ++= δα )(ln        (1) 
 
where jhyln  represents the natural log of per capita household expenditure, iz  represent 
all other background factors that relate observed factors to total utility. jhe  is a random 
component which captures other unobserved factors that affect total utility, α and hδ are 
unknown parameters. We assume that the criterion on which households make their 
choices is by comparing utility associated with each alternative. Let *hV  denotes the 
difference in utility between two choices which can be expressed as: 
 
hhhhhhh ezyyUUV −−−=−= δα )ln(ln 0101*     (2) 
 
where hhh eee 01 −= and 01 δδδ −= . Although the difference in utility cannot be 
observed, the decision taken by a household is observed as a binary outcome such that: 
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1=∈ jJ h  if 0* >hV and 0=j  otherwise      (3) 
 
Other things being equal, equation (3) indicates that households choose to participate in 
the programme only if the utility from participation is higher than the alternative, non-
participation.  We therefore assume that the difference between expected daily per capita 
household expenditure associated with each alternative is a key decision variable that 
influences household participation decisions. Assuming that this daily per capita 
household expenditure varies among households depending on their participation status 
and differences in observable characteristics hhh zxx ∈= , expenditure equations 
associated with each alternative can be written as:  
hhh xy 1111ln εσβ +=  if 1=j        (4a) 
hhh xy 0000ln εσβ +=  if 0=j       (4b) 
where hy0ln and hy1ln  denote the natural log of daily per capita household expenditure 
associated with participation and non-participation, respectively. 1 0 and β β  are unknown 
parameters, 1 0 and σ σ are standard deviations. h1ε  and h0ε  are the error terms with 
0)|( =hhj xE ε   
 
Our aim is to establish if indeed commercialisation enhances household expenditures in 
Malawi. If daily per capita household expenditure for all participants were recorded 
before commercialisation and if households were randomly selected into the programme, 
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the impact of the programme would be estimated by simply taking the difference between 
mean expenditures before and after the programme, i.e.: 
 
hhh yyATE 01 lnln)( −=pi        (5) 
such that )(ATEhpi  would be a measure of the impact of commercialisation . A common 
problem in programme evaluation is the missing data problem where outcomes (i.e., daily 
per capita household expenditure) for households are observed for only one state and no 
information in the counterfactual state is available. Using average daily per capita 
household expenditure for non-participants to estimate the average treatment effect 
(ATE) in absence of the counterfactual outcome data for participants would bias the true 
impact of the programme due to endogeneity and sample selection biases. From equations 
(4a) and (4b), the observed outcome is expressed as:  
 
)())(1(lnln)1(ln 111000 hhhhhhh xjxjyjyjy εσβεσβ +++−=+−=  (6) 
 
This shows that participation is endogenously determined. Given the selection criterion in 
equation (3), the conditional expectation of household expenditure associated with 
decision jJ h ∈  can be expressed as: 
 
 )|()1,|(ln 1111 hhhhhh zExjxyE γεεσβ −>+==     (7a) 
)|()0,|(ln 0000 hhhhhh zExjxyE γεεσβ −<+==     (7b) 
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where hε is the error term for selection (participation) equation, hz  is a vector of 
variables that determine participation decision and γ  is a vector of unknown parameters. 
The terms )|( 1 hhh zE γεε −> and )|( 0 hhh zE γεε −< in equations (7a) and (7b) 
respectively are non-constants due to correlation between the error terms of the selection 
(participation) and outcome (expenditure) equations.  
 
This correlation arises because it is impossible to observe a household with and without 
programme participation simultaneously, and lacking a panel data set that allows 
observation of households before and after programme participation, impact analysis in 
this article is based on comparing household outcomes differentiated by participation in 
market agriculture (commercialisation) while simultaneously controlling for various other 
factors that affect the outcome in question (for example, levels of prior owned human and 
physical capital). However, not all of the “other factors” can be measured or even 
observed. For example, in Malawi many farmers reveal a strong preference to secure food 
needs before engaging in market agriculture. This behaviour is probably affected by 
issues of risk aversion, know how and lack of insurance. Traditional agriculture may be 
the consequence of risk aversion, but may be related to know how and lack of insurance, 
other factors such rainfall and soil quality differences, innate abilities, entrepreneurship, 
social skills, and management abilities make some households more productive than 
others, but these cannot be fully observed or adequately measured. If these same factors 
also affect a household’s participation in market agriculture, selectivity bias results and 
attribution becomes difficult (Heckman 1979). As reported in Morduch (1997), this type 
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of selection bias can lead to an overestimation of impact by as much as 100 percent 
(McKernan 1996).  
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 The data 
 
This article uses data from the 1997–98 Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS) 
conducted by the National Statistical Office (NSO). The survey was administered to 
12,960 households over a 12-month period. In rural areas, a three-stage sample selection 
process was used, consisting of the traditional authority (TA), the sub district spatial unit, 
as the first stage and enumeration areas (EA) within the TA as the second stage. Roughly, 
one TA was selected for every 50,000 households in the stratum. Twelve EAs were 
selected in each selected TA. Both TAs and EAs were selected with probability of 
selection proportional to population size. Twenty households were randomly selected 
within the selected EAs as the third stage of rural sample selection. All selected 
households in an EA were interviewed in the same calendar month. Interviewing was 
carried out in each of the 12 selected EAs in a TA in turn through the 12 months of the 
survey year in order to capture seasonal variation. The questionnaire was administered in 
two parts. The first was a large questionnaire that was administered to the respondent 
household in a single visit. This consisted of approximately a dozen modules on 
household composition, educational attainment, health and nutritional status, agriculture, 
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home-produced and purchased consumption items, assets, and so on. The second part was 
a diary of expenditure.  
 
4.2 Analytical Framework 
 
In this section we discuss the analytical framework that informs the econometric 
estimation of commercialisation and poverty.  The article uses the Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM), this method has been used in recent times to evaluate the impact of 
various programmes (Bryson et al., 2002; Heckman et al., 1999). Rosenbaun & Rubin 
(1983) showed that it is possible to use a base set of covariates to predict the likelihood 
than a household will participate in commercialisation (p(X)) using logit, probit, or some 
other method. This is known as the propensity score and is measured on a unit scale (1 
being treated, 0 being the untreated or control). These propensity scores are used to match 
treatment group households with control group households. The difference in per capita 
household expenditure can then be compared by groups of matched data, and the average 
treatment effect (ATE) can be calculated. 
 
Conditioning on propensity scores was shown to reduce selection bias by Rosenbaun & 
Rubin (1983) and the method has since been used to analyse various issues-from effect of 
treatment on medical outcomes (Imbens 2000; D’Agostino 1998) to the effect of fertility 
on marital dissolution (Vuri 2001). It has also been a growing part of the analysis on 
labour markets (Sianesi, 2004; Lechner, 2002; Bryson et al., 2002; Heckman, 1997; 
Heckman et al., 1999; Hirsch & Mehay, 2002; Angrist & Kruger, 1999, Smith & Todd, 
 12 
2005; Dehejia & Wahba, 1999, 2002; and Dehejia, 2005) and other evaluation economic 
issues like globalisation (Balat & Porto, 2005) and in other economic evaluations 
(Heckman et al., 1998; Blundell & Dias, 2002; Heckman & Navarro-Lozano, 2003).  
 
The propensity score works because if treatment and control groups are similar in X, then 
there are no selective differences in the outcome of interest between the two groups 
(Heckman et al., 1999). Propensity score matching has added bonus of being more 
convenient than other methods e.g. instrumental variables since they condition the 
analysis on only the variables thought to influence the outcome, and do not require 
additional variables. 
 
The aim is to determine whether household expenditure for participants in market 
agriculture (a proxy for commercialisation), especially for female-headed and poor 
households has improved or dropped due to commercialisation. 
 
To assess the impact of commercialisation, we apply matching methods on per capita 
household expenditure for participant households and non-participant households. The 
idea behind matching is to create randomness in programme assignment on assertion that 
if untreated households (non-participants) have the same probability of participation as 
treated households (participants), then average per capita household expenditure for non-
participants is a good approximation of what participants would have earned had they not 
participated in the programme. The difference in average per capita household 
expenditure between the two groups, referred to as the ‘average treatment effect’ would 
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therefore yield unbiased estimates of the gross gains to participants from the programme 
(Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). Thus, our parameter of interest is: 
  
 )1|ln(ln)1,|( 01 =−≡= jyyEJzE hhhATEhpi     (12) 
 
where )1,|( =jzE hATEhpi  is the average treatment effect,  hy1  and hy0  are the per capita 
household expenditures of participant households and non participants households 
respectively. 
 
According to Smith & Todd (2005), using conditioning variables to identify control units 
(non-participants) to match with the treated units (participants) becomes difficult if the 
number of variables zh is large with different dimensions, some being continuous and 
others discrete, referred to as the ‘curse of dimensionality’. To address this problem, 
Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) showed that if outcomes (e.g., per capita household 
expenditure) are independent of participation conditional on hz , then they (outcomes) are 
also independent conditional on the propensity score, ( )p z . This implies that 
)()|(|1Pr( zpzJEzj hhh ≡==  such that: 
)(,,,, 0101 zpJyyzJyy hhh ⊥⇒⊥  
where ( )p z has lower and upper bounds 1)(0 << zp . This assumption reduces the multi-
dimension of conditioning variables to a single index, the propensity score with which 
matching can be performed. However, Imbens (2000) suggests that a weaker assumption 
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of untreated outcome (i.e., per capita household expenditure for non-participants) being 
independent conditional on covariates zh and therefore on the propensity score ( )p z  
[ ])1|())(|(,0.,. 000 =≅⇒=⊥ jyEzpyEzjyei hhh  suffices to identify the distribution of 
)1,|( =jzE hATEhpi  over a common support of zh given 1j = , i.e.:  
 
∫
∫
=
==
=
z
z
h
s
hhz
s
hhzhATE
dzjzF
dzjzFjzE
ATE )1|(
)1|()1,|(
)(ˆ
pi
pi     (13) 
where )(ˆ ATEpi  is the expected value of the programme effect which is the average over 
a region of common support of hz denoted as zs  and zF  is the density of hz . This makes 
it possible to compare per capita household expenditure for participants and non-
participants with different values of hz but having the same propensity score ( )p z . The 
general matching estimator can be given by: 
[ ]∑
∩∈
=−=
zSth
hhATE zpjyEy
n
))(,0|(ˆ1ˆ 01
1
pi      (14) 
Where ∑
∈
−
==
0
0
1
00 ),())(,0|(ˆ
n
ch
hh yctwnzpjyE , 1 0 and n n  denote number of participants 
and non-participants within a region of common support zs . (.)w  is a weighting function 
that depends on the distance between the propensity score for participants and non-
participants. From equation (13), a match for each participant household zsth ∩∈  is 
constructed as a weighted average over per capita household expenditure for non-
participants with the same propensity score as participants (see, Smith & Todd, 2005). 
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For empirical application, four matching estimators are used, namely, nearest neighbor, 
radius, kernel and stratification matching. The nearest neighbour matching involves 
estimating the difference in average per capita household expenditure between 
participants and non-participants having the closest propensity score as for participants. 
We implement nearest neighbour matching with replacement to minimise asymptotic 
bias by allowing non-participants to be matched with more than one participant. The 
‘average treatment effect’ is calculated as the difference between average per capita 
household expenditure for participants and non-participants. Radius matching is similar 
to nearest neighbour matching except that participants are matched with non-participants 
within 0.1 radius of the propensity score for participants. With Kernel matching, all 
participants are matched against a weighted average for all non-participants with weights 
that are inversely proportional to the distance between propensity scores for participants 
and non-participants. Finally stratification matching involves dividing the sample into 
different intervals of the propensity score. Within each interval or block, participants and 
non-participants have the same average propensity score. The difference in the average 
per capita household expenditure between the two groups is estimated for each block and 
the overall average income is computed using weights based on the distribution of 
participants across all blocks. For details see Abadie et al., (2001), Dehejia & Wahba 
(2002) and Becker & Ichino (2002). 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
5.1 Sources of Household Income 
 
This section begins with a description of the sources of income.  This is important for two 
reasons. First, by affecting wages and cash agricultural income, trade opportunities are 
likely to have large impacts on household resources and on poverty. As argued by Deaton 
(1997) and others, the short-run effects of price changes can be assessed by looking at 
income shares. Secondly, the description of income shares is also useful because it 
highlights the main channels through which trade opportunities can have an impact on 
household income. 
 
Table 1 reports the average income shares for different sources of income. At the national 
level, the main sources of income are income from home consumption (43.1  per cent), 
and wages (28.2  per cent). Regarding agricultural income, the sale of cash crops 
accounts for 5.1 percent of total income, while the sale of livestock and products account 
1.3 percent of household income. 
 
There are important differences in income sources between poor and non-poor 
households. While the share of own-production is over half of the total (55.9 per cent) in 
the average poor household, it is less than half (38.1 per cent) in non-poor households. In 
contrast, while wages account for 30.9 per cent of the total income of the non-poor, they 
account for only 21.5 per cent of the income of the poor. The shares of the income 
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generated in non-farm businesses are 2.3 per cent and 10.5 per cent in poor and non-poor 
households respectively.  
 
It is interesting to compare the different sources of income across the regions. In rural 
areas (southern, central and northern region), for instance, the percent of total income 
accounted for by own-production ranges from 36.0 per cent to 49.6 per cent; the share in 
urban areas is only 4.3 per cent. The share of non-farm income in rural areas is between 
1.4 per cent in the northern region and 16.9 per cent in the southern region, which should 
be compared with a 21.4 per cent in urban areas. In urban areas, in contrast, wages 
account for over half (55.8 per cent) of household income, and the contribution of 
agricultural activities is much smaller.  
 
The results indicate that in rural areas, households derive most of their income from 
subsistence agricultural and agricultural wage employment. Cash crop activities and non 
farm activities comprise a smaller fraction of total household income.  
 
  [Table 1 around here] 
 
5.2 Average Household Budget Shares 
 
In order to investigate some of the consumption effects of commercialisation in Malawi, 
Table 2 reports the average budget shares spent by Malawian households in different 
goods. As expected, most of the budget was spent on food, with a national average share 
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of 61.5 per cent. The average was higher in rural areas (ranging from 59.2 per cent to 
65.0 per cent) and lower in urban areas (35.2 per cent).  
 
Further, the poor spent a larger share of total expenditure on food than the non-poor. At 
the national level, for instance, 76.0 per cent of the total expenditure of an average poor 
household was devoted to food, while for non-poor households the average was 55.4 per 
cent. Other goods accounting for a significant share of total expenditure were clothing, 
housing and gifts, transfers or loans. However, these average shares were always below 
10 per cent. The usual differences between urban and rural households and between the 
poor and the non-poor were observed. For instance, differences between the poor and non 
poor in expenditures other than food depends largely on the region of residence. The 
patterns are more diverse for the non-poor households than poor households in both rural 
(southern, central and northern regions) and the urban areas. In the rural areas, the non 
poor have proportionately larger expenditures for clothing, housing and gifts. In urban 
areas, the non poor households spend more on education, housing, travel and gifts. The 
urban non poor households, fuels account for a greater proportion of household 
expenditure than their non poor counterparts. Another observation from this table is that 
on average expenditure levels for urban households are double the levels of in rural areas, 
reflecting differences in cost of living between the rural and the urban areas. 
 
There is one fundamental lesson that can be learnt from Table 2. In Malawi, as in many 
low income developing countries, the largest fraction of household expenditure is spent 
on food. In consequence, the largest impacts of trade policies and economic reforms on 
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the consumption side will be caused by changes in the prices of food items. Expenditures 
on other non-food items are relatively less important in terms of total expenditure, the 
welfare impacts being lower as a result. 
 
  [Table 2 around here]  
 
5.3 Absolute and relative household per capita expenditure 
 
Table 3 presents absolute and relative estimates of per capita household expenditure 
differential for different groups. The average expenditure for participating and non 
participating households in commercialisation is reported in the first and second column 
respectively. The third column displays the difference between average per capita 
household expenditure for participating and non participating households and the t-
statistics (in brackets) testing the null hypothesis that the mean difference is zero. The 
fourth column presents relative percentage change in average per capita household 
expenditure between the two groups. 
 
If the average daily per capita household expenditure for non participating households 
were accurate estimates of what the participating households would earn had they not 
participated in market agriculture, negative figures from last column in Table 1 would 
imply significant reductions in daily per capita household expenditure for participating 
households.   From the table it can be seen that for the whole sample the results are highly 
significant at 1 per cent level. This means that daily per capita expenditure for 
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participants would increase by 17 per cent. In terms of regional differences, it is 
important to note that the only the results from the southern region are not significant, 
indicating that commercialisation had no impact on households in the southern region. 
These results suggest that commercialisation would enhance the daily per capita 
household expenditure for the central, northern and urban regions.  
 
  [Table 3 around here] 
 
The per capita household expenditure for participating households in the central region 
would increase by 7 per cent, while those in the northern region would be enhanced by 
about 18 per cent and the highest benefits would be in the urban areas where the expected 
benefit from commercialisation would be an increase in daily per capita household 
expenditure of participating households by over 50 per cent. Among the poor households, 
commercialisation would actually reduce daily per capita household expenditure for 
participating households by 13 per cent, while female headed participating households 
would sacrifice 12 per cent of their expenditure.  
 
In general raw data presented above seem to indicate that participants benefit more from 
commercialisation than non participating households. While this may imply that 
commercialisation is conducive to enhance expenditures for participating households, it 
also indicates that the benefits are not always positive for all groups. Nonetheless, using 
average daily per capita household expenditures to make inferences about the impact of 
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commercialisation may be flawed due to counterfactual problems since we do not have 
data for before and after the event.  
 
 The results from the propensity score matching estimates of the effect of 
commercialisation on poverty are presented in Table 4. Because of the different matching 
methods used, different sample sizes are used for each of the estimates and the different 
matching methods can be considered a sensitivity analysis of the propensity score 
matching overall. All estimates are based on the common support and satisfy the 
balancing requirement.  
 
  [Table 4 around here] 
 
Table 4 indicates that estimates of average treatment effects are consistently positive and 
not statistically significant across sub samples suggesting that commercialisation does not 
generate beneficial outcomes to participating households. In general, the sizes of the 
estimates from different matching estimates are different. As noted by Smith & Todd 
(2005), results from the different methods are sensitive to the set of variables used in the 
propensity scores as well as the sample used in estimating the average treatment effect. In 
other words, the results are sensitive to the matching method used. 
 
From the table, only estimates from the radius matching method are statistically 
significant while those from the rest of the matching methods are not significant and the 
estimates from the nearest neighbour method are negative. In general, estimates of the net 
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gains to programme participants are positive at 1 per cent level using the radius matching 
method. This suggests that the household per capita expenditure of participating 
households was 7.3 per cent higher than what they would have spend had they not 
participated in commercialisation. 
 
For the regional analysis, it is intriguing to note that estimates from all four matching 
methods in the southern region and consistently negative and highly significant, 
suggesting that commercialisation has negative effects on household per capita 
expenditure. Results indicate that participating in commercialisation significantly reduces 
household per capita expenditure by between 12.1 per cent and 22.4 per cent. In contrast 
the rest of the regions indicate a positive gain from commercialisation. In the central 
region only the radius matching method is significant at 10 per cent indicating a benefit 
of 6.3 per cent in household per capita expenditure of participating households. The 
results from the northern region are positive and significant for two matching methods 
(radius and kernel matching methods). The estimates show that households in the 
northern region spent between 11.4 per cent and 17.4 per cent more on household 
expenditure per person per day than what they would have spent had they not participated 
in market agriculture.  The major winners from commercialisation were those residing in 
the urban areas where the gains ranged from 23 per cent to 24 per cent. This could be as a 
result of the commercialisation affects household through changes in wages and from 
table 1; households in the urban areas derived a higher proportion of their income from 
employment (69.2 per cent and 53.7 per cent for poor and non poor households 
respectively). 
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The last section of table 6 analyses the extent to which the livelihood of the vulnerable 
groups, namely female headed and poor households, is affected by commercialisation. 
The estimates indicate that commercialisation generates positive expenditure gains for 
male headed households (8.6 per cent more per capita expenditure than without 
commercialisation using the radius matching method) while generating negative benefits 
to female headed household who experienced reductions in household per capita 
expenditure of about 13.5 per cent by participating in commercialisation.(stratification 
matching method). 
 
Similarly, empirical results from all matching methods indicate that poor households 
experienced reductions in household per capita expenditure of between 11.2 per cent and 
12.5 per cent than what they would have spend had they not participated in 
commercialisation. This contrasts with the gains of between 11.1 per cent and 24.4 per 
cent in household per capita expenditure experienced by non poor households (radius and 
kernel matching methods).  
 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, some of the impacts of commercialisation on households in Malawi have 
been investigated. Malawi is a low income country, with widespread and prevalent 
poverty at the national and regional levels. In rural areas, poverty is still higher. In 
Malawi, the government and international institutions have long been actively searching 
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for programmes and policies to improve the living standards of the population. 
Concretely, a set of reforms were implemented during the 1990s, including liberalisation, 
privatisation, and deregulation of marketing boards in agriculture. After episodes of 
economic reforms, households are affected both as consumers and as income earners.  
 
Using simple comparison without controls, the results indicate that overall those 
household who had participated in commercialisation had a higher welfare indicator than 
the comparators. In terms of regional analysis the southern region and the central region 
results indicate that the participants were actually worse of that non participant.  The 
livelihoods of the most vulnerable households in Malawi (female headed and poor 
households) did not benefit from commercialisation.  
 
Using the propensity score matching techniques, we find some evidence from radius 
matching that commercialisation leads to higher household per capita expenditure. The 
matching results indicate that commercialisation participants gained about 7 per cent 
more household expenditure above what they would have spent had they not participated 
in the commercialisation. 
 
The results from the regional analysis show a reduction in welfare for households in the 
southern region using all four matching methods of between 12 per cent and 22 per cent, 
respectively. In contrast, results for the rest of the regions suggest that commercialisation 
leads to an increase in household per capita expenditure by 6 per cent in the central 
region (radius matching method), increases of between 11 per cent and 17 per cent in the 
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northern region (radius and kernel matching methods) and between 23 per cent and 24 
per cent in the urban areas (for all four matching methods). These contradictory findings 
can be explained by the differences in the relative contribution of cash crop sales and 
wage employment to the total household income and the average budget shares. The 
southern region has a higher contribution of household income coming from non farm 
businesses (Table 1) than the rest of the rural regions. On the other hand, urban areas 
have the highest contribution to total household income from wage employment for both 
the urban poor and non poor. This indicates that commercialisation may not be 
appropriate in areas where the largest fraction of household expenditure is spent on food 
and the largest impacts of trade policies and economic reforms do not affect changes in 
the prices of food items because expenditures on other non-food items are relatively less 
important in terms of total expenditure, the welfare impacts being lower as a result. 
 
In spite of the contrasting evidence across the areas, it is intriguing to find strong 
evidence that the livelihood of women would have worsened in due to commercialisation. 
Results indicate that female headed household participants reduced their household per 
capita expenditure by 14 per cent due to commercialisation. The finding underscores the 
need for designing gender-focused economic reform programmes.  
 
Finally, results from matching techniques indicate that poor households’ per capita 
expenditure is between 11 per cent and 13 per cent less than what it would have been had 
they not participated in commercialisation. 
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Figure 1: Commercialisation and Poverty 
 
Source: Bokosi, 2007
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Table 1: Sources of Household income (percentage) 
    National       
Southern 
Region     
Central 
Region     
Northern 
Region     
Urban 
Region 
  Total  Poor 
Non-
poor 
  Total  poor 
non-
poor 
  Total  Poor 
non-
poor 
  Total  poor 
non-
poor 
  Total  poor 
non-
poor 
Net food crop sales* -0.6  -0.5  - 0.6   
               
0.9  
               
1.6  
             
0.7   - 2.2  -2.2  -2.2   
              
0.1  - 0.5  
              
0.5   -0.5  -1.0  -0.4  
Net cash crop sales* 
               
5.1  
               
6.7  
               
4.5   
               
1.1  
               
2.0  
             
0.9   
              
9.0  
            
10.7  
              
8.3   
              
5.1  
             
5.9  
              
4.7   
              
1.0  
              
0.2  
              
1.1  
Net livestock and 
products sales* 
               
1.3  
               
1.8  
               
1.0   
               
0.9  
               
1.5  
             
0.7   
              
1.3  
              
1.8  
             
1.0   
              
2.4  
              
2.4  
             
2.5   
              
0.1  
              
0.2  
               
0.0   
Net non farm business 
sales* 
               
8.2  
               
2.3  
             
10.5   
      
16.9  
               
2.8  
           
21.4   
              
1.6  
              
2.1  
             
1.4   
              
1.4  
              
1.7  
             
1.1   
            
21.4  
              
8.1  
            
23.6  
Employment income 
             
28.2  
             
21.5  
             
30.9   
             
31.2  
             
27.1  
             
32.4   
            
26.6  
            
16.8  
            
30.7   
            
24.2  
            
22.1  
            
25.5   
            
55.8  
            
69.2  
       
53.7  
In-kind income 
               
2.7  
               
1.5  
               
3.2   
               
1.9  
               
2.0  
             
1.8   
              
4.0  
              
1.3  
             
5.2   
              
1.1  
              
0.9  
          
1.2   
              
5.0  
              
0.8  
              
5.7  
Interest income 
               
0.7  
               
0.1  
               
1.0   
               
1.3  
               
0.1  
             
1.6   
              
0.4  
              
0.1  
            
0.5   
               
0.0   
               
0.0   
            
0.1   
              
1.7  
              
0.2  
              
1.9  
Rental income 
               
1.5  
               
1.0  
               
1.6   
               
1.3  
               
1.2  
          
1.3   
              
1.8  
              
1.3  
             
2.0   
              
1.0  
              
0.2  
             
1.5   
              
3.0  
              
3.6  
              
2.9  
Other income 
               
4.4  
               
3.5  
               
4.8   
               
3.7  
               
1.2  
             
4.6   
              
4.3  
              
4.0  
             
4.4   
              
7.2  
              
7.0  
             
7.3   
              
4.8  
              
2.5  
              
5.2  
Incoming income 
transfers 
               
5.3  
               
6.2  
               
5.0   
               
4.8  
               
6.3  
             
4.3   
              
3.7  
              
4.1  
             
3.6   
            
12.7  
            
11.4  
            
13.5   
              
3.4  
              
4.6  
              
3.2  
Value of home 
production consumed 
             
43.2  
             
55.9  
             
38.1   
             
36.0  
             
54.2  
             
30.3   
            
49.6  
            
60.0  
            
45.1   
        
44.7  
            
48.9  
            
42.2   
              
4.3  
            
11.8  
              
3.1  
 
              
100  
              
100  
              
100   
              
100  
              
100  
             
100   
             
100  
             
100  
             
100   
             
100  
             
100  
             
100   
             
100  
             
100  
             
100  
Total per capita daily 
income (MK) 10.39 4.96 18.39   9.39 3.66 18.65   11.01 5.80 17.80   12.34 7.69 19.76   31.69 8.56 55.57 
*Net sales are calculated as the difference between total sales and total costs (for inputs or other costs) except for net food crop sales which does not represent the difference 
between sales and purchases of food crops 
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Table 2: Average Budget Shares (percentage) 
   National   Southern Region 
 
Central Region  
  
Northern Region   Urban Region 
  Total  poor 
non-
poor 
 Total  poor 
Non-
poor 
 Total  poor 
non-
poor 
 Total  Poor 
non-
poor 
 Total  poor 
non-
poor 
Food    61.5  
   
76.0  
   
55.4      59.2  
   
74.4  
   
52.5      62.9  
   
78.4  
   
57.0      65.0  
   
74.3  
   
59.8      35.2  
   
57.5  
   
29.8  
Fuels      3.7  
     
4.3  
     
3.4        3.3  
     
4.1  
     
3.0        4.1  
     
5.3  
     
3.7        3.1  
     
2.4  
     
3.5        3.9  
     
7.7  
     
3.0  
Clothing      6.6  
     
5.2  
     
7.2        6.2  
     
4.7  
     
6.8        6.4  
     
4.9  
     
7.0        8.9  
     
7.6  
     
9.6        6.7  
     
5.5  
     
7.0  
Education       3.2  
     
1.7  
     
3.8        3.8  
     
1.7  
     
4.7        2.6  
     
1.3  
     
3.2        2.8  
     
2.8  
     
2.8        6.3  
     
1.7  
     
7.5  
Health      1.3  
     
1.1  
     
1.3        1.7  
     
1.2  
     
1.9        1.0  
     
1.0  
     
1.0        0.8  
     
0.9  
     
0.7        2.3  
     
2.2  
     
2.4  
Household consumer 
durables      3.4  
     
2.1  
     
3.9        3.6  
     
2.2  
     
4.2        2.9  
     
1.9  
     
3.3        4.0  
     
2.7  
     
4.7        4.1  
     
2.8  
     
4.4  
Housing and repairs      7.8  
     
3.0  
     
9.8        9.3  
     
4.3  
   
11.6        7.3  
     
2.0  
     
9.4        3.6  
     
1.7  
     
4.5      19.5  
   
11.2  
   
21.4  
Travel related      2.2  
     
0.8  
     
2.8        2.1  
     
1.0  
     
2.6        2.5  
     
0.6  
     
3.2        1.5  
     
1.0  
     
1.8        4.4  
     
1.8  
     
5.1  
Gifts, transfers, or 
loans      5.1  
     
2.0  
     
6.4        5.1  
     
2.6  
     
6.2        5.2  
     
1.5  
     
6.5        4.7  
     
1.6  
     
6.4        8.4  
     
4.2  
     
9.4  
Investment related      1.0  
     
0.3  
     
1.3        0.7  
     
0.2  
     
0.9        1.2  
     
0.3  
     
1.5        1.1  
     
0.6  
     
1.4        2.2  
     
0.9  
     
2.5  
Personal goods      2.7  
     
3.0  
     
2.6        3.0  
     
3.0  
     
2.9        2.6  
     
2.4  
     
2.6        3.3  
     
3.5  
     
3.4        3.0  
     
3.3  
    
2.9  
Other      1.5  
     
0.5  
     
2.1        2.0  
     
0.6  
     
2.7        1.3  
     
0.4  
     
1.6        1.2  
     
0.9  
     
1.4        4.0  
     
1.2  
     
4.6  
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Table 3: Average per capita household expenditure differentials in Malawi Kwacha 
(MK) 
Overall MP  
(S.E.) 
NP  
(S.E.) 
Difference  
(t-statistic) 
Relative 
expenditure 
differential (%) 
Full sample 
(MP=3110, NP=3476) 
14.24 
(0.304) 
12.13 
(0.171) 
2.11*** 
(6.209) 
17.39 
Southern Region 
(NP=1120, NP=1348) 
11.91 
(0.390) 
11.96 
(0.308) 
-0.05 
(0.110) 
-0.42 
Central Region 
(MP=811, NP=1568) 
12.96 
(0.364) 
12.12 
(0.225) 
0.84** 
(2.05)) 
6.93 
Northern Region 
(MP=333, NP=477) 
15.07 
(0.805) 
12.73 
(0.415) 
2.34** 
(2.808) 
18.38 
Urban Regions 
(MP=846, NP=83) 
18.24 
(0.857) 
11.77 
(1.531) 
6.47*** 
(2.33) 
54.97 
Poor  households      
Full sample 
(MP=1718, NP=1862) 
6.28 
(0.057) 
6.74 
(0.049) 
-0.46 
(6.19) 
-6.82 
Southern Region 
(MP=690, NP=734) 
5.86 
(0.093) 
6.73 
(0.075) 
-0.87*** 
(7.35) 
-12.93 
Central Region 
(MP=440, NP=831) 
6.60 
(0.103) 
6.73 
(0.075) 
-0.13 
(1.031) 
-1.93 
Northern Region 
(MP=162, NP=242) 
6.91 
(0.158) 
6.98 
(0.127) 
-0.07 
(0.362) 
-1.00 
Urban  Regions 
(MP=426, NP=55) 
6.40 
(0.116) 
6.02 
(0.274) 
0.38 
(1.118) 
6.31 
Female-headed households     
Full sample 
(MP=653, NP=952) 
12.81 
(0.603) 
11.48 
(0.316) 
1.33** 
(2.11) 
11.59 
Southern Region 
(MP=308, NP=488) 
10.84 
(0.645) 
11.59 
(0.460) 
-0.7556 
(0.977) 
-6.47 
Central Region 
(MP=131, NP=337) 
10.40 
(0.644) 
11.33 
(0.528) 
-0.93 
(0.989) 
-8.21 
Northern Region 
(MP=67, NP=111) 
12.15 
(1.149) 
11.51 
(0.718) 
0.64 
(0.506) 
5.56 
Urban Regions 
(MP=147, NP=16) 
19.39 
(2.095) 
11.29 
(3.182)) 
8.10 
(1.257) 
71.74 
Notes: MP =Market participants; NP=non-programme participants; *P<0.10, **P<0.05, 
***P<0.001; Stars indicate that the means are statistically different between participants and non-
participants. 
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Table 4: Estimates of expenditure gains from commercialisation (Ln per capita daily expenditure in Malawi Kwacha) 
Nearest neighbour Radius Matching Kernel Matching Stratification ATE  
nT nC ATE S.E. nT nC ATE S.E. nT nC ATE S.E. nT nC ATE S.E 
                   
Full sample 2307 1159 -0.011 0.051 2307 4026 0.073*** 0.019 2307 4026 0.013 0.039 2307 4026 0.002 0.042 
Regional Analysis 
                
Southern Region 737 499 -0.224*** 0.042 737 1591 -0.121*** 0.032 737 1591 -0.187*** 0.039 737 1608 -0.216*** 0.040 
Central Region 547 410 -0.025 0.056 547 1811 0.063* 0.034 547 1811 -0.011 0.036 547 1811 -0.035 0.043 
Northern Region  277 180 0.058 0.078 277 522 0.174*** 0.054 277 522 0.114** 0.058 276 533 0.099 0.070 
Urban Regions 746 71 0.199 0.140 746 75 0.247** 0.107 746 75 0.229** 0.111 746 75 0.228** 0.114 
Gender Analysis                 
Male Headed  1885 909 0.005 0.065 1885 2902 0.086*** 0.020 1885 2902 0.045 0.042 1885 2902 0.039 0.050 
Female Headed 422 242 -0.162 0.113 422 1124 -0.017 0.045 422 1124 -0.077 0.076 408 1138 -0.135* 0.080 
Poverty Analysis 
                
Non poor 
Households 
1101 461 0.112 0.087 1101 1840 0.244*** 0.017 1101 1840 0.111* 0.064 1101 1840 0.087 0.065 
Poor Households 1206 678 -0.125*** 0.024 1206 2185 -0.114*** 0.014 1206 2185 -0.112*** 0.019 1206 2186 -0.112*** 0.020 
ATE=‘average treatment effect’; S.E.-bootstrapped standard errors;*, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively. 
 nT=number of treated, nC= number of controls  
 
